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INTRODUCTION
Although some studies have reported a category specific
naming deficit in Alzheimer’s patients (invariably for liv-
ing things), others have failed to replicate this finding (Laws
et al., in press). Inconsistencies may partly stem from the
fact that category effects are hidden in group analyses be-
cause individual Alzheimer’s patients show category defi-
cits in opposing directions, namely, some living and some
nonliving (Gonnerman et al., 1997). Additionally, category
effects may depend upon the specific composition of living
things, such as the ratio of animals to fruits and vegetables,
though this has never been explicitly examined. To exam-
ine this, we conducted a more detailed fractionation of liv-
ing and nonliving categories for individual patients.
RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
This study included 18 patients (14 female; 4 male; M age 5
77.5 6 7.5) with probable Alzheimer’s dementia. Their mean
MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975) was 18.03. All patients were
living at home and visiting a day-center.
Twenty-six normal subjects (12 female; 14 male; M age 5
72.35 6 4.9) were recruited through their general practi-
tioner, who screened them for good health. They had no
history of head injury, neurological or psychiatric illness,
and alcohol or drug abuse. English was the first language in
all participants.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
Participants viewed 120 color images from the Category
Specific Names Test (McKenna, 1997) comprising 60 liv-
ing and 60 nonliving things presented in order of normative
naming difficulty. These consist of 30 fruits and vegetables;
30 animals; 30 praxic objects (objects with a specific asso-
ciated action, e.g., darts); and 30 nonpraxic objects (ob-
jects with no specific associated action, e.g., calendar). The
stimuli were matched across category for familiarity and
name frequency.
RESULTS
Analysis across category revealed no difference between
living and nonliving naming for either the Alzheimer’s pa-
tients (14.78 6 10.25 vs. 12.94 6 9.65; F , 1) or the healthy
controls (44.57 6 7.2 vs. 44.92 6 5.03; F , 1).
The four subcategories (Ms and SDs for patients and
controls are detailed in Table 1) were analyzed for differ-
ential deficits using a method developed by Crawford and
Garthwaite (2002). This estimates the abnormality of the
difference between an individual’s score on one test with
the mean of the individual’s score on a series of k tests (in
this case, three other subcategories). The measure also es-
timates the percentage of the population that would obtain a
more extreme discrepancy (and provides 95% confidence
limits on this measure). This analysis was conducted using
gender- and age-matched control data. For documenting a
differential deficit, we used the criterion that less than 5%
of the normal population would be estimated to achieve a
discrepancy score below that of the patient (see Table 2).
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Table 1. Naming scores for Alzheimer’s patients and elderly





Subcategory M 6 SD M 6 SD
Fruit and Vegetables 8.00 6 5.73 22.65 6 4.31
Animals 6.78 6 5.86 21.38 6 4.76
Praxic 6.39 6 5.25 23.62 6 3.91
Nonpraxic 6.56 6 4.67 20.77 6 3.23
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Fifty percent of patients had differential deficits for fruits
and vegetables (19018 patients), namely, they were signif-
icantly more impaired on this one subcategory than the oth-
ers (although they may have been impaired on all). In fact,
7 patients had differential deficits that would be repre-
sented in less than 1% of the normal population (the remain-
ing 2 scored ,10%). By contrast, no patients showed a
differential deficit for naming of animals. Indeed, for ani-
mals, the naming difference score in 14018 patients was
above the 95% difference score for normal elderly subjects.
For nonliving things, 3 patients had borderline deficits for
praxic objects; none were impaired for nonpraxic items.
DISCUSSION
Although we failed to find a general deficit for the category
of living things, a finer analysis of living things into fruits
and vegetables versus animals revealed a high deficit in-
cidence for the former and no deficits for the latter (indeed
animals were relatively intact). This suggests that, in the liv-
ing thing category per se, better patient naming of animals
compensates for their poorer fruit and vegetable naming.
Turning to the discrepancy between fruits0vegetables and
other living thing categories, one possible explanation for
this, is the modulatory effect of color. Although different
tokens of the same type of fruit (e.g., compare different
examples of strawberry, carrot, tomato) can have quite dif-
ferent shapes, their color tends to be less variant and more
diagnostic (Laws & Ahktar, in press). The interaction of
visual variables (e.g., shape, color) and different levels of
categorization may underlie some of the more unusual cases
of category specificity; for example, where animals doubly
dissociate from fruits and vegetables (Hart et al., 1985;
Hillis & Caramazza, 1991). One possibility is that Alzhei-
mer patients suffer some greater difficulty with differenti-
ating similarly shaped items on the basis of color. Indeed,
recent studies have shown that young children (Macario,
1991) and even rhesus monkeys (Santos et al., 2001) show
a preference or bias for categorizing food objects according
to color rather than shape. This strongly indicates domain-
specific processing for foodstuffs and the data reported here,
highlights a differential impairment of this domain in Alz-
heimer’s disease. Given these data and the rationale for
such a differentiation, it is important for future studies of
category effects to separate analysis of animals on the one
hand from that for foodstuffs on the other.
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Table 2. Z-score discrepancies from patient’s mean z score
Patient
Fruit and
vegetables Animals Praxic Nonpraxic
1 20.86 2.24 20.51 21.08
2 20.76 4.08 22.25 21.39
3 22.36* 3.20 20.62 20.36
4 2.36 20.65 21.88 0.21
5 24.94** 3.49 0.46 1.06
6 21.53 0.79 1.43 20.81
7 24.40** 4.02 20.60 1.02
8 0.54 1.86 21.56 21.05
9 24.25** 3.90 20.07 0.39
10 23.42** 1.89 0.37 1.29
11 23.40** 2.58 21.06 2.11
12 21.51 2.15 22.00 1.49
13 24.06** 4.35 20.72 0.37
14 24.56** 4.26 0.38 20.22
15 0.44 1.74 20.81 21.64
16 20.38 2.14 20.86 21.11
17 22.59* 2.43 20.35 0.52
18 21.52 0.08 1.36 0.10
Mean 22.06 2.47 20.52 0.05
**Difference score occurs in ,1% of the normal population.
*Difference score occurs in ,10% of the normal population.
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